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Waligore: Environmental Law

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
January 1, 1980, marked the tenth anniversary of the enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA or the
Act).1 The purpose of its enactment was to require federal agencies to consider the possible environmental consequences of their
actions. 2 Toward this end, the environmental impact statement
(EIS) requirement3 was intended as an "action forcing" provision, insuring the preparation of a document that would demonstrate that an agency is complying with the mandated analysis
examining the possible environmental impact of its actions. 4
After ten years of court interpretation, there continues to be
a considerable amount of litigation concerning the meaning and
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). Section 4342 of NEPA established the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) to promulgate guidelines for compliance with the Act to
lie used by federal agencies. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.i-1500.10 (1978). Although the previous
guidelines were advisory only, new guidelines issued effective July 30, 1979, are binding
on all federal agencies. 43 Fed. Reg. 55,978 (1978).
2. Section 102 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1976); CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §
1500.2 (1978). See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE HANDBOOK (1976); 2 F. GRAD, The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, in TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ch.9 (1978 & Supp., 1979); R. LIROFF, ANA·
T10NAL POLICY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITs AFTERMATH (1976); PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND LITIGATION (1976);
Sive, Environmental Decisionmaking: Judicial and Political Review, 28 Case W. RES. L.
REV. 827 (1978); McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX.
L. REV. 801 (1977).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (1976) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[A Jll agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . .
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and
'
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
See generally M. Baker, J. Kaming, and R. Morrison, Environmental Impact Statements:
A Guide to Preparation and Review (1977); Symposium on the Environmental Impact
Statement, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243 (1976).
4. Bardach & Pugliaresi, The Environmental Impact Statement vs. the Real World,
49 PUB. INTEREST 22, 24 (1977).
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scope of NEPA. The continued controversy has been caused in
part by the unclear language of the Act, unilluminated by its
legislative history.5 More significantly, the Act has given environmental groups a legal and political weapon that they have used
"to cancel, delay, or modify development projects that they oppose."8 These plaintiffs most often use the technical and procedural requirements of NEPA to challenge agency action through
lawsuits alleging a failure to prepare an EIS or, if an EIS has been
prepared, attacking its scope or content. 7
During the Survey period, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, in its consideration of challenges to agency action under
NEPA, focused its decisions on an interpretation of what constitutes major federal action that significantly affects the human
environment. The court also considered issues relating to the timing of an EIS and standing to sue. S
I. MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION
A.

IMPLEMENTATION BY FEDERAL AGENCY OF LONG-RANGE
REGIONAL PROPOSAL FOR DEVELOPMENT

During the Survey period, the Ninth Circuit expanded the
scope of NEPA by ruling that development and implementation
of long-range regional proposals by federal officials were major
federal actions.
In Port of Astoria, Oregon u. Hodel, U an action was brought
to declare void a contract for the supply of electrical power by the
Bonneville Power Administration (BP A) 10 to Alumax Pacific Corporation (Alum ax) . Plaintiffs 11 alleged that the execution of the
5. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314,1319 (9th Cir.
1974) (en bane).
6. See Bardach and Pugliaresi, supra note 4, at 23.
7. Anderson & Rosencranz, The Future of Environmental Defense, 61 A.B.A.J. 316
(1975). The authors criticized the primary emphasis on litigation and proposed alternative
strategies.
8. See California Tahoe Regional Planning Ag'cy v. Jennings, 594 F.2d 181 (9th Cir.
Feb., 1979), for the court's most recent interpretation of the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact. Note, Environmental Law, Ninth Circuit Survey, 6 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
571 (1976) for a survey of cases addressed by the Ninth Circuit on these and other environmental issues during the 1974-1975 Survey term.
9. 595 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. Mar., 1979) (per Tang, J.; the other panel members were
Kennedy, J., and Jameson, D.J.).
10. BPA, a federal agency, markets hydroelectric power generated by federal dams
on the Columbia River. [d. at 471.
11. Plaintiffs were the Port of Astoria (Port), Concerned Citizens of Clatsop County
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contract was major federal action and should be voided since no
EIS had been prepared. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that, although an EIS would have to b~ prepared
before inplementation of the contract, the contract was not void. 12
The contract between BPA and Alumax required that BPA
build power lines and supply industrial firm power l3 to an aluminum reduction plant that Alumax planned to build in Umatilla
County, Oregon (the Umatilla contract)." BPA had previously
initiated the Hydro Thermal Power Program in order to meet the
expanding needs of its existing and new customers. 15 Under Phase
2 of the program, BPA was to act as sales agent to its industrial
customers for the power produced by thermal generating plants
to be built by non-federal utilities. The industrial firm power
contracts of Phase 2 provided an advance market for the thermal
plant's output, thereby helping to partially finance the building
of those plants. The contracts also provided industries with the
power commitments they needed before they could build. The
end result of the program was to provide for and to promote
regional industrial growth and expansion.
In the district court and on appeal, plaintiffs alleged that the
execution of the Umatilla contract was major federal action requiring preparation of an EIS because it: 1) changed the site of
the proposed plant; 2) enabled construction and operation of the
Umatilla plant and transmission lines necessary to service it; 3)
obligated BPA to supply large amounts of power to Alumax; and
4) was the first industrial firm power contract thus initiating
Phase 2 of the Hydro Thermal Program. 18 The plaintiffs further
(Concerned Citizens), Hermiston Broadcasting Company, and five named individuals
who were either members of Concerned Citizens or residents of Umatilla County. [d. at
473.
12. [d. at 479-80.
13. The grades of power to be supplied ranged from "interruptible power," subject
to restriction at BPA's discretion, to "firm power" which, apart from unavoidable circumstances, had to be continuously supplied. "Industrial firm power" does not denote a
particular grade of power but a method for distributing power to industry. [d. at 471-72.
14. In 1966, BPA contracted with Northwest Aluminum Company to supply power
to a plant to be built in Clatsop County, Oregon (the Warrenton contract). In 1970, that
contract was assigned to Alumax. In 1975, Alumax decided to change the proposed plant's
site from Clatsop County to Umatilla County. [d. at 473.
15. [d. at 471. Under Phase 1 of the Hydro Thermal Power Program, initiated in 1968,
BPA planned to buy power from non-federal utilities and sell it to its industrial customers.
In response to funding and accounting problems with Phase I, Phase 2 was initiated in
1973. [d. at 471-72.
16. [d. at 473-74.
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requested that the EIS include consideration of the Phase 2 aspects of the contract.17 BPA argued that its contractual commitment, the Warrenton contract, antedated NEPA, and that it was,
therefore, not obligated to prepare an EIS on the Umatilla plant.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, finding that the Umatilla contract was, in terms of significant environmental consequences, "an entirely new project affecting an area not contemplated in earlier contracts between BPA and Alumax or its predecessors."18 Therefore, this was "further major federal action" that
required BPA to prepare an EIS on the Umatilla plant and the
power transmission lines. 19
The Ninth Circuit further required that an EIS be prepared
on Phase 2 of the Hydro Thermal Power Program which would
include consideration of industry's role in Phase 2 and an assessment of the new energy commitment to Alumax. 2o The court
found that the execution of the Umatilla contract was a proposal
for major federal action not only because it was a new commitment of BPA's energy resources but because it also set the stage
for the initiation of Phase 2.21 The court rejected BPA's assertion
that Phase 2 was not a federal program in finding that BPA's
participation integrated, and was essential to, the entire program. 22
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus,23 the Ninth Circuit, in a ruling that relied on Port of Astoria, held that a regional
plan to market water was major federal action. In 1967, the Department of Interior began a program to market water from the
Yellowtail and Boysen Reservoirs for industrial use. 24 As part of
this program, seventeen option contracts for the industrial use of
17. [d. at 474.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

[d. at 477.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 478.

23. 596 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. Apr., 1979) (modified and rehearing den., June, 1979) (per
curiam).
24. The reservoirs are located in the Northern Great Plains region, the economy of
which is predominantly agricultural. However, the region contains one of the richest
strippable coal deposits in the world. The availability of water for industrial uses is a key
factor in making stripmining feasible. [d. at 850. See Veeder, Water Rights in the Coal
Fields of the Yellowstone River Basin, 40 Law and Contemp. Prob. 77, 77-78 (1976);
Stewart and Leary, How Coal Will Change the West, S.F. Examiner, July 22, 1979, at 1,
col. 4 (previewed.).
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water were executed between 1969 and 1971. No EIS was prepared for either the marketing program or the individual option
contracts. 25 Plaintiffs, a coalition of environmental, wildlife and
agricultural organizations, filed suit against the Secretary ofInterior alleging that the sale of water from those projects was in
violation of the Flood Control Act. 28
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants, finding no violation of the
Flood Control Act, but reversed the district court's holding that
an EIS was not required. 27 The court found the water marketing
plan to be a proposal for major federal action 28 and the option
contracts to amount to federal action which, by its terms, made
an "irreversible and irretrievable commitment of available resources."29 As such, both the water marketing plan and each individual option contract required the preparation of an EIS.30

B.

THE COURT'S REASONING

In determining whether or not there was major federal action, the court examined not only the specific action in controversy, but also whether that action was part of a larger, and more
environmentally significant, program. In Environmental Defense
Fund, the Secretary never disputed the need for preparation of
an EIS for each individual option contract. 3t Similarly, in Port of
Astoria, SPA did not dispute that the Umatilla contract was
major federal action significantly affecting the environment.
What BPA did dispute was whether that contract was further
major federal action requiring an EIS.32
In response, the Port of Astoria court, in accord with previous
25. 596 F.2d at 851.
26. [d. at 849. Enacted in 1944, the Flood Control Act authorized the establishment
of water projects in the Missouri River Basin. 33 U.S.C. § 701·1 (1944). The Yellowstone

and Boysen Reservoirs, which were the subject of the litigation, were both authorized
water projects under the Act. [d. at 850.
27. [d. at 849·50.
28. [d. at 851.
29. [d. at 852.
30. [d. at 853. "These requirements are applicable even though the marketing plan
and some of the option contracts were executed prior to January I, 1970. Both . . . are
ongoing and require continuing attention and action." Id.
31. [d. at 852. What was in dispute was the timing of the EIS. See text accompanying
notes 87·89 infra.
32. 595 F.2d at 477.
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Ninth Circuit decisions 33 and decisions of a majority of the circuits,34 held that "an EIS is required to assess a major federal
project initiated before the effective date of NEPA when the project entails a further major action that would occur after NEPA's
effective date and that would significantly affect the quality of
the human environment."35 Here, the Umatilla contract allowed
Alumax to change the site of the proposed plant, initiating an
entirely new project not contemplated in the previous contract. 36
In both Port of Astoria and Environmental Defense Fund,
the major dispute centered around whether long-range regional
proposals were major federal actions. The determinations that
the proposals were major federal actions were based primarily
upon the court's concern with the possibility of long-term, significant environmental impact that might result from implementation of those programs.
The Umatilla contract, in itself a significant concern of the
court in Port of Astoria, assumed its full importance when seen
as the first step in the implementation of Phase 2 of the Hydro
Thermal Power Program. 37 The Umatilla contract, like other firm
power contracts BPA planned to make, contained a provision
whereby BPA could require its industrial customers either to shift
the source of power from BPA to a Phase 2 thermal plant or to
accept a restrictable grade of power from BPA. This contract
33. See San Francisco Tommorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 1973)
(amendments to loan contracts which increased federal funding only to provide for rising
costs of San Francisco redevelopment project did not constitute further major federal
action; but, change from industrial park project to neighborhood development program
in Berkeley after the effective date of NEPA was major federal action); Jicarilla Apache
Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1973) (NEPA applies to all
major federal actions taken after January 1, 1970, regardless of whether project to which
the action is related was initiated prior to that date).
For a recent case in which the Ninth Circuit found no further major federal action,
see Westside Prop. Owners v. Schlesinger, 597 F.2d 1214, 1223-24 (9th Cir. May, 1979)
(post-NEPA formalization of pre-NEPA agreement not further major federal action).
34. Accord, Hart v. Denver Urb. Renewal Auth., 551 F.2d 1178, 1181 (10th Cir. 1977);
Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 541 F.2d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d
885,891 (lst Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164,1177 (6th
Cir. 1972); Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1034-35 (7th Cir. 1972); Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412,424 (2d Cir. 1972); CEQ Guidelines, 40
C.F.R. § § 1506.12, 1508.18(a) (1978). Contra, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v.
Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n, 464 F .2d 1358, 1366 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1118 (1973).
35. 595 F.2d at 477.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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prOVISIOn was intended to provide an advance market for the
thermal plant's output, helping to finance the plants and allow
the non-federal utilities to build plants larger than those dictated
by the current demand. 3s The end result was to provide for industrial expansion by establishing a reserve of electrical power.
The court held that Phase 2 was clearly a long-range regional
program which could have a substantial environmental impact39
and, as such, was a proposal for major federal action within the
contemplation of section 4332 (2)(C) of the Act.40
In Environmental Defense Fund, the court took a substantially similar approach in assessing the industrial water marketing program. Prior to the marketing program, no reservoir water
had been set aside for industrial use. The availability of water for
industrial use was a key factor of feasibility in developing the
region's strippable coal deposits. Since water is a limited resource
throughout the region, "[a]llocation of the region's water resources will determine the nature and extent of future development, whether agricultural or industrial."41
Although the Secretary of Interior had developed an industrial water marketing program and had executed option contracts committing hundreds of thousands of acre feet of water in
accordance with that program, no EIS had been prepared for
either the marketing program or the individual option contracts.
In finding that there had been a proposal for major federal action
which could significantly affect the environment,42 the court held
that an EIS must be prepared for both the marketing plan and
each individual option contract.43
When the federal courts first considered whether major federal actions would have a significant cumulative regional impact,
the trend was to require the preparation of an EIS not only for
the specific actions, but also one for· the total effect on the regional environment. 44 In 1976, the United States Supreme Court
·38. [d. at 472. The shift from BPA power to thermal power would result in higher
costs to the industrial customers.
39. [d. at 478.
40. [d. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C)(1970). For the statutory language of § 4332 (2)(C) see
note 3 supra.
41. 596 F.2d at 850.
42. [d. at 851.
43. [d.
44. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786,795 (9th Cir. 1975) (EIS on coal leases covering
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in Kleppe v. Sierra Club 45 imposed a stricter standard. 46
The plaintiffs in Kleppe, several environmental organizations, brought suit requesting that even though an EIS had been
prepared for specific coal mining plans, further development of
coal reserves in the Northern Great Plains region should not be
allowed until a comprehensive regional EIS was prepared. Although finding no regional plan or program, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia reversed the district court and required preparation of a regional EIS, concluding that such a plan
was "contemplated" for the regionY The Supreme Court, in reversing the appellate court, found all proposals for development
of coal resources to be of either local or national scope. 48 The court
ruled that, "[iln the absence of a proposal for a regional plan of
development, there is nothing that could be the subject of the
analysis envisioned by [NEPAl for an impact statement."49
In both Port of Astoria and Environmental Defense Fund,
the Ninth Circuit distinguished Kleppe in finding regional programs that required preparation of an EIS. The Port of Astoria
court found that BPA had prepared and released a proposal for a
regional program expanding the development and distribution of
power resources in a document entitled "Hydro Thermal Program
Phase 2."50 In Environmental Defense Fund, the court found the
option contracts to be a part of a regional industrial water mar770 acres of 30,876 acre program not sufficient); see also Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info.,
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086-88 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013,1021.
22 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972). Contra, Nucleus on Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 230 (7th Cir. 1975).
45. 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
46. See generally Comment, Environmental Law-NEPA-Regional Impact Statement is Not Required in the Absence of Formal Proposal for Regional Activity-Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 5 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 512, 515 (1977); Note, National Environmental Policy
Act: Federal Officials Are Not Required by the National Environmental Policy Act to File
an Impact Statement on the Regional Impact of Coal Development on Federal Lands in
the Northern Great Plains, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 707 (1977); Note, The
Scope of the Program EIS Requirement: The Need for a Coherent Judicial Approach, 30
STAN. L. REv. 767, 785-92 (1978).
47. 427 U.S. at 403.
48. Id. at 399.
49. Id. at 401. For subsequent cases finding no regional program, see Texas Comm.
on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201, 210-11 (5th Cir. 1978); Sierra Club v.
Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1976); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt. v. Secretary of
Transp., 531 F.2d 637, 639-40 (2d Cir. 1976). Contra, CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4
(1978).
50. 595 F.2d at 477-78.
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keting program initiated by the Secretary of Interior. 51 In both
cases, the court found these programs to be clearly within the
contemplation of NEPA.52
C. THE N ON EXERCISE OF POWER BY AFEDERAL OFFICIAL DOES NOT
CALL FOR COMPLIANCE WITH NEPA
In State of Alaska u. Andrus,53 the Ninth Circuit limited the
scope of NEP A by ruling that inaction by the Secretary of Interior
was not major federal action. The State of Alaska instituted a
wolf-kill program as part of a plan to increase the size of its
rapidly diminishing caribou herds. Part of the killing was done
on federal lands within the state's borders. Through the federal
courts, the Defenders of Wildlife and other animal-welfare groups
(Defenders) attempted to force the Secretary of Interior to stop
the program. 54 Defenders argued that the Secretary had the power
to stop the program,and that he was required by NEPA to prepare an EIS before choosing to exercise or refrain from exercising
that power. The District Court for the District of Columbia issued
a preliminary injunction compelling the Secretary to halt the
program. 55 The Secretary issued a directive, and the State of
Alaska stopped the program. The Secretary then appealed the
preliminary injunction to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia which remanded the case without opinion. 58
Shortly thereafter, the State of Alaska brought suit in district court seeking a declaration that the Secretary had no power
to stop the wolf-kill program, or that if he did, he was not required
to prepare an EISY The Secretary protested that he had no power
to stop the wolf-kill program and that he had issued his directive
only to comply with the District of Columbia court order. Defenders, as intervenors, contended that the Secretary did have that
51. 596 F.2d at 850·51.
52. Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d at 478; Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus,
596 F.2d at 851.
53. 591 F .2d 537 (9th Cir. Feb., 1979) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were
Wright, J., and Jameson, D.J.).
54. [d. at 538-39. Defenders contended that the Secretary was empowered to close
federal lands to the wolf-kill program by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782 (1976), and the AJaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1627 (1976).
55. For the opinion of the district court, see Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 9 ERC
2111 (D.D.C. 1977).
56. 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
57. 591 F.2d at 539. The suit was brought in district court in Alaska; the State of
Alaska was not a party to the District of Columbia litigation.
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power and that he must prepare an EIS even ifhe did not exercise
that power.58
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the district court ruling that
the Secretary need not prepare an EIS, did not reach the question
of whether the Secretary had the power to stop the program. 59 The
court ruled that even if the Secretary had the power to stop the
wolf-kill program, "his failure to exercise that power-in effect,
his inaction-was not the type of conduct that. requires an
[EIS]."80
The court reasoned that when federal agencies propose to
take a leading role in activity affecting the environment an EIS
must be prepared. 8t Furthermore, when the primary actors are
not federal, but rather state or local governments or private parties, "significant federal funding turns what would otherwise be
a local project into a major federal action."82 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that "[t]he Ninth Circuit ... has not been
receptive to arguments that impact statements must accompany
inactions, or actions that are only marginally federal."83 In State
58. [d.
59. [d. at 538.
60. [d. at 540.
61. [d. See Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d at 478; Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe,
541 F.2d at 445.
62. [d. See Homeowners Emergency Life Protection Comm. v. Lynn, 541 F.2d 814,
817 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (federal disaster· relief funding for municipal dam and
reservoir project was major federal action).
63. 591 F.2d at 541. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 323,328 (9th
Cir. 1975) (mere federal approval of aspects of an airport expansion plan were insufficient
to constitute major federal action when projects would proceed without federal funding
or approval); Molokai Homesteaders Coop. Assoc. v. Morton, 506 F.2d 572,580 (9th Cir.
1974) (the right to object to violations of its loan agreements was but a potential for action
by a federal agency); San Francisco Tomorrow v. Romney, 472 F.2d at 1024·25 (the federal
action was but a ministerial continuation of an ongoing redevelopment program). Accord,
City of Blue Ash v. McLucas, 596 F.2d 709, 713 (6th Cir. 1979); City of Highland Park v.
Train, 519 F.2d 681, 694·95 (7th Cir. 1975); Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158, 162·63 (4th
Cir. 1973); City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 1972); Bradford Township
v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 463 F.2d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1972); Civil Improvement
Comm. v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 957, 958 (4th Cir. 1972). Contra, Virginians for Dulles, 541 F.2d
at 445; Scenic Rivers Assoc. of Okla. v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240, 243·44 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc. of Okla., 426 U.S.
776 (1976); Proetta v. Dent, 484 F.2d 1146, 1149 (2d Cir. 1973); Jones v. Lynn, 477 F.2d
at 891; Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972); Hawthorn Envir. Preserv.
Assoc. v. Coleman, 417 F. Supp. 1091, 1101 (N.D. Ga. 1976), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 1066
(5th Cir. 1977); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841
(D.D.C. 1974)~ aff'd mem., 627 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976).
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of Alaska, the court found that no federal funds were to be spent,
nor were federal agents to be employed, in the wolf-kill program. 84
Therefore, the court held, "[ t ]he Secretary's nonexercise of any
authorities and duties he may possess. . . was, at most, a nonuse
of a power of supervision. . .. "85
D.

WHAT CONSTITUTES MAJOR FEDERAL ACTION-THE NINTH
CIRCUIT ApPROACH

In City of Davis v. Coleman,88 the Ninth Circuit announced
its standard for requiring an EIS. The City of Davis sought to
enjoin the building of a highway interchange which was partially
federally funded, alleging a violation of NEPA because no EIS
had been prepared. The court rejected the Secretary of Interior's
argument that the action was of a purely local and private nature,
holding that the project, its purposes, and its effects were federal
action. s7 Furthermore, "the main purpose ofthe interchange, and
its only credible economic justification, [was] to provide access
, . . for future industrial development"88 which would have significant environmental consequences. 8U The City of Davis court
held that the threshold test for requiring preparation of an EIS
was met when a plaintiff "allege[s] facts which, if true, show
that the proposed project would materially degrade any aspect of
environmental quality."70 The court rejected a standard requiring
that "federal action that significantly affects the environment
must also be 'major' in an economic or some other nonenvironmental sense to trigger the EIS requirement."71 The court reasoned:
To separate the consideration of the magnitude of
federal action from its impact on the environment
does little to foster the purposes of the Act ....
By bifurcating the statutory language, it would be
64. 591 F.2d at 541.
65. [d.
66. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
67. [d. at 677.
68. [d.
69. [d. at 676.
70. [d. at 673, quoting Environmental Def. Fund v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814,817 n.
5 (9th Cir. 1973). The City of Davis court further stated: "This standard does not require
the court to determine whether a challenged project will in fact have significant effects.
Rather, we are to determine whether the responsible agency has 'reasonably concluded'
that the project will have no significant adverse environmental consequences." 521 F.2d
at 673 (emphasis in original).
71. 521 F.2d at 673 n.15.
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possible to speak of a "minor federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," and hold NEPA inapplicable to such
an action.. . . [T]he activities of federal agencies cannot be isolated from their impact upon the
environment. 72

Although there is a significant split among the circuits on this
standard, the Ninth Circuit has clearly placed itself among the
growing minority. 73
In this Survey period, the Ninth Circuit extended the City
of Davis standard to cover proposals for regional action which
might materially degrade any aspect of environmental quality.
Although in neither Port of Astoria nor Environmental Defense
Fund was the City of Davis standard referred to specifically, in
both cases the court used similar reasoning in deciding whether
or not to require preparation of an EIS.74 Based on that reasoning,
the courts' concern with the probability of long-term, significant
environmental impacts resulting from implementation of those
regional programs manifested the need for an EIS.75

State of Alaska was, on the other hand, one of a number of
attempts by the Ninth Circuit to define the limits of what constitutes major federal action. 7' Arguably, there was no major federal
action that would significantly effect the environment in the
72. Id., quoting Minesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314,1321·
22 (8th Cir. 1974) (en banc).
73. See Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d at 1321-22; Wyo·
ming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 1973); Environmental Def. Fund v. TVA, 468 F.2d at 1177; CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18
(1978). But see Cross·Sound Ferry Serv., Inc. v. United States, 573 F.2d 725,731 (2d Cir.
1978); Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d at 1088;
Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d at 1032-33; City of Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d at 259; Ely v. Velde,
451 F.2d 1130, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1971); San Antonio Conserv. Soc'y v. Texas Highway
Dep't, 446 F.2d at 1025; Borough of Morrisville v. Delaware River Basin Comm'n, 399 F.
Supp. 469, 477 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd mem., 532 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1976).
74. See text accompanying notes 34-43 supra.
75. Environmental Def. Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d at 861; Port of Astoria v. Hodel,
695 F.2d at 478.
76. See cases cited in note 63 supra and accompanying text; see also B. R. S. Land
Investors v. United States, 596 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (contemplation of
action by federal agencies does not require an EIS); Lake Berryessa Tenants' Council v.
United States, 588 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (change of management of
recreational lake from county to federal agency does not require an EIS); Friends of the
Earth v. Coleman, 513 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1975) (fill for highway taken from possible canal
site; EIS need not take into account effect of cana!); Robinswood Community Club v.
Volpe, 506 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1974) (mere participation of federal government in project
subsequent to effective date of NEPA is not further major federal action).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss1/9
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cases the court relied on in its holding,17 In State of Alaska, however, the court's choice of words in describing the Secretary's
conduct was determinative in its ruling.
In discussing the Secretary's conduct as "inaction," the court
reasoned that such inaction could not be major federal action for
the purposes of NEPA.78 If the Secretary's conduct had been
viewed instead as an acquiescence to the conducting of the wolfkill program on federal lands, the application of the City of Davis
standard would require the preparation of an EIS. Defenders met
that standard when alleging that the program could materially
degrade environmental quality.79 Although the State of Alaska
court found that no federal funds were spent nor federal agents
employed in the wolf-kill program, the City of Davis court rejected the argument that "federal action that significantly affects
the environment must also be 'major' in an economic or some
other non environmental sense .... "so In bifurcating the test for
requiring an EIS, the State of Alaska court not only created a
conflict within the circuit, but has done little to foster the purposes of the Act. 81
II.

TIMING

A.

AN EIS SHOULD BE PREPARED AT AN EARLY STAGE WHEN
ALTERNATIVES ARE STILL POSSIBLE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DAMAGE CAN BE MITIGATED

In Port of Astoria and Environmental Defense Fund, the
Ninth Circuit addressed the question of at what stage of a project
an EIS must be prepared. In Port of Astoria, BPA argued that
preparation of an EIS on Phase 2 was premature since the execution of firm power contracts by its industrial customers other than
Alumax was a "mere contingency."82 The court, in rejecting this
contention, found that BPA and its large industrial customers
were operating under letter agreements which were, in effect,
industrial firm power contracts. 83 Furthermore, BPA had no in77. See cases cited in note 63 supra.
78. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
79. See text accompanying note 70 supra. For the allegations of significant environmental impact of the wolf-kill program see Defenders of Wildlife, 9 ERe at 2112-13.
SO. See text accompanying note 71 supra. See also Defenders of Wildlife, 9 ERe at
2118.
81. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
82. 595 F.2d at 478.
83. [d.
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tent ion of abandoning its industrial sales policy.s4 Although the
details of Phase 2 remained unsettled, the court held that NEPA
did not permit delaying assessment of environmental factors until
BPA was "faced with the reality of executed contracts and the
necessity of supplying power to industry .... "85 Rather, the
court held that "assessment should occur at an early stage when
alternative courses of action are still possible and environmental
damage can be mitigated."88
In requiring the preparation of an EIS for both the water
marketing program and the option contracts, the court in
Environmental Defense Fund held that "[a]ny uncertainty
about the details of subsequent use of the diverted water does not
obviate the importance of the decision to divert and the necessity
to evaluate the environmental consequences of that decision."87
The court rejected the argument that an analysis of environmental impact was impossible until the option holder had developed
detailed plans and exercised the option, stating that" [a]n EIS
at this stage is necessary to assist the government in evaluating
the impact of the water diversion itself and also alternative commitments of the water."88 The court was concerned that a delay
in the preparation of an EIS could make all parties less flexible
since, after a major investment of time and money, it was likely
that more environmental harm would be tolerated. 89
B.

TIMING-A CRUCIAL QUESTION

Since its opinion in Lathan v. Volpe, DO the Ninth Circuit has
consistently held that an EIS must be prepared at an early stage
of a project so that agencies can avoid or minimize adverse environmental impacts. 91 The court's main concern with delay has
84. [d.
85. [d.
86. [d.

87. 596 F.2d at 851.
88. [d. at 852.
89. [d. at 853.

90. 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971) (even though federal officials had not given final
approval for proposed interstate highway, there was sufficient major federal action to
require an EIS).
91. [d. at 1120-21. See Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d at 794; City of Davis v. Coleman,
521 F.2d 661, 675-76 (9th Cir. 1975); Friends of the Earth v. Coleman, 518 F.2d at 327.
Accord, Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 557 F.2d 1122, 112526 (5th Cir. 1977); Shiffler v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 1977); Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 539 F.2d 824,
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been that more environmental harm would be tolerated. 92 Although there may exist a substantial amount of uncertainty
about the environmental impact of a project, the court has held
that such uncertainty is not an excuse for failure to prepare an
EIS.93 What is required is that an agency use its best efforts to
reasonably forecast environmental impacts and consider reasonable alternatives. 9•
III. STANDING
Standing to sue is the threshold question in NEPA litigation.
It has been accepted by all circuits that have considered the
matter95 that a plaintiff has standing when he alleges "that the
agency action has caused him an 'injury in fact' and that this
injury is 'arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated' by the statute that the plaintiff claims the agency
violated."98
845 (2d Cir. 1976); Scientists Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d
at 1086 n. 29; Hawthorn Envir. Preserv. Assoc. v. Coleman, 417 F. Supp. at 1101; CEQ
Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2, 1502.4 (c), 1502.5 (1978). Contra, Conservation Council
v. Costanzo, 528 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1975).
92. Environmental Def. Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d at 853.
93. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 676. Accord, Natural Resources Def. Coun·
cil, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 539 F.2d at 841; Arkansas Power
and Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 517 F.2d 1223,1236·37 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Scien·
tists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d at 1098. Contra, Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 402 (1976); Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners v. Lynn, 524
F.2d at 230; Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11,17 (8th Cir. 1973); Upper Pecos
Assoc. v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1236·37 (10 Cir. 1971).
94. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d at 676; CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14,
1502.16 (1978).
95. See Texas Comm'n on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d at 204 n. 1;
Shiffler v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d at 102; City of Rochester v. United States Postal Serv.,
541 F.2d 967, 972 (2d Cir. 1976); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498
F.2d at 1325; Ohio ex reI. Brown v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1235, 1242 (6th Cir. 1974); Scien·
tists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d at 1079; Upper Pecos
Assoc. v. Stans, 452 F.2d at 1235.
96. Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d at 474 quoting A88ociation of Data Processing
Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972),
the Supreme Court held that injury to noneconomic interests, such as aesthetic and
environmental well. being, was a cognizable injury. "But the 'injury in fact' test requires
more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured." [d. at 734·35. In United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP I), 412 U.S. 669, 689·90 (1973), the Court applied
the Sierra Club test and found that respondents, who asserted injury to their aesthetic
and environmental well·being, had standing to sue under NEPA when challenging an
agency for failure to prepare an EIS.
For a more expansive and progressive view of standing, see Justice Douglas' dissent
in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 741·52; C. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING?
(1974).
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The Ninth Circuit most recently discussed the issue of standing in Port of Astoria. Although finding that all other plaintiffs
had standing, the court denied standing to the Port, since its
injuries represented "only pecuniary losses and frustrated financial expectations," which allegedly occurred as a result of the
relocation of the Alumax plant. V7 In addition, the court rejected
the Port's asserted interest in preventing estuary and stream pollution within its district that would be caused by the Alumax
plant, finding that the Port had only a remote interest and was
not an agency primarily responsible for environmental quality.9s
In denying the Port standing, the court disregarded the growing trend to allow standing to any plaintiff who alleges injury of
anything more than a purely economic interest. 99 When the area
of control and expertise of a state agency may be environmentally
affected by a federal project, that agency should be entitled to
standing. 100
CONCLUSION

Although the Ninth Circuit has been reluctant to require an
EIS for every federal action or to allow every plaintiff standing,
it has established relatively low threshold tests. 101 In City of
Davis, the court enunciated good, workable standards for major
federal action and timing. Unfortunately, in its subsequent attempts to define the breadth and limitations of NEPA, the court
has continued to rely on a case-by-case analysis instead of one
based on the City of Davis standards with results such as State
of A laska. Ten years of court interpretation of NEP A should provide a sufficient basis for the enunciation of clear and precise
rules. If it is concerned with the growing volume of litigation, the
Ninth Circuit should explicitly adopt and apply the City of Davis
standards so that government agencies, environmental plaintiffs
97. 595 F.2d at 475. Although the injury to Hermiston Broadcasting Company was
economic (the power transmission lines for the Alumax plant would interfere with its radio
broadcasts), the court held that Hermiston's injuries were "causally related to an act that
lies within NEPA's embrace." [d. at 476.
98. [d. at 475 (citing legislative history of NEPA and the CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.9 (c) (1977)).
99. See Sherwin, On the Firing Line of Environmental Law, 13 CAL. TRIAL LAW. J.
9, 11 (1974); CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1508:14 (1978).
100. See 595 F.2d at 480 (concurring opinion per Kennedy, J.).
101. Unlike some other circuits, the Ninth Circuit has not taken a broad substantive
review approach. See Note, Environmental Law, Ninth Circuit Survey, 6 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 571, 571-572 (1976).
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and, most importantly, the district courts will clearly understand
the court's basis for assessing agency compliance with NEPA.
Robert G. Waligore
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